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Unemployment, sanctions and mental health: the relationship between benefit 
sanctions and antidepressant prescribing 
Abstract 
International social security systems increasingly place work-related conditions on individuals 
claiming out-of-work benefits, and enforce requirements through the use of benefit sanctions. The 
literature on the impacts of benefit sanctions considers both labour market and wider social effects, 
which this study contributes to through a focus on mental health. It considers the period of Coalition 
government (2010-15) in the UK, which imposed a comparatively high number of benefit sanctions 
and increased their severity through the Welfare Reform Act 2012. A longitudinal dataset is 
constructed using quarterly local authority-level data on Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) sanctions and 
antidepressant prescriptions in England. Results from fixed effects analyses indicate that, in the post-
reform period, every 10 additional sanctions are associated with 4.57 additional antidepressant 
prescribing items (95% CI: 2.14 to 6.99), which translates to approximately one additional person 
receiving treatment. Importantly, this finding indicates that sanctions are associated with both 
adverse mental health impacts and wider public expenditure implications, which motivates further 
investigation at the individual-level. In addition, punitive sanctions form a core part of the new 
Universal Credit (UC) and so the results suggest the need to reassess the use of sanctions within the 
contemporary social security system.  
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Unemployment, sanctions and mental health: the relationship between benefit 
sanctions and antidepressant prescribing 
1. Introduction 
Across international social security systems, work-related behavioural conditions are increasingly 
attached to the receipt of out-of-work benefits and enforced through the threat and imposition of 
benefit sanctions (Knotz, 2018). The ethical justification of this process is highly contested by 
competing normative frameworks, though a central issue that all perspectives must attend to 
concerns the ‘effectiveness in practice’ (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018: 152) of conditional approaches. 
Research into the impacts of conditionality and sanctions has predominantly focused on labour 
market effects (Griggs and Evans, 2010), though a growing literature identifies a wider range of 
sanction-related outcomes such as financial hardship, homelessness and food bank usage (Watts et 
al., 2014). This article contributes to the empirical literature through a quantitative investigation into 
the mental health impacts of benefit sanctions, and thereby aims to inform the debate surrounding 
the role of conditionality within the contemporary social security system.  
Whilst the development of ‘activation requirements’ has occurred internationally, this article 
considers the UK which currently maintains one of the most punitive approaches towards 
unemployment benefits across Europe and the OECD (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). Whilst successive 
UK governments have expanded and intensified the work-related behavioural requirements 
demanded of claimants, the focus in this article is on sanctions policy during the Coalition 
government (2010-15). This period is characterised by what Webster (2016: 2) describes as a ‘great 
sanctions drive’, in which a comparatively high number of benefit sanctions were imposed and their 
severity increased through the Welfare Reform Act 2012. Following this period, a review of the 
benefit sanctions regime by the National Audit Office (NAO, 2016a) concluded that the reforms 
introduced by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) were not informed by sufficient 
evidence, which it argued needed to consider labour market effects alongside wider impacts on 
claimants and additional public expenditure costs. This informs the current aim to consider the 
impact of these changes now that they have been implemented.  
Specifically, this article investigates the relationship between Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) sanctions 
and antidepressant prescribing, an outcome that reflects impacts on both the mental health of 
claimants as well as on public expenditure more widely. To do so, a longitudinal dataset is 
constructed that uses quarterly local authority-level data on JSA sanctions and antidepressant 
prescriptions in England. Fixed effects models are then estimated that control for differences 
between local authorities, permitting investigation into the relationship between changes in JSA 
sanctions and corresponding changes in antidepressant prescribing within local authorities 
themselves. Importantly, the analysis considers whether this relationship changed following the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012, and the subsequent implementation of a comparatively harsher sanctions 
regime. These developments form the basis for current sanctions policy within Universal Credit (UC), 
and so the study offers insights to be considered as UC continues its protracted rollout. The 
remainder of this paper is divided into four parts: section 2 provides greater detail into sanctions and 
their possible links to mental health, followed by an explanation of the data and methods (section 3) 
and results of the analysis (section 4). Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.  
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2. Background 
Conditionality, activation and benefit sanctions 
Entitlement to unemployment benefits has never been fully unconditional; initial access, for 
example, has always been regulated by rules that require claimants to be available for work (Adler, 
2016). In recent decades, however, a process of ‘benefit activation’ (Clasen and Clegg, 2011: 9) has 
seen the re-configuration of international social security systems so as to increasingly demand the 
fulfilment of work-related behavioural requirements as a condition of ongoing benefit receipt. 
Consequently, claimants are now expected to meet various availability and suitable work criteria, as 
well as job-search requirements and participation in training programmes or even unpaid work 
placements (Immervoll and Knotz, 2018). These conditions are enforced through monitoring and the 
threat and imposition of financial penalties, known as benefit sanctions. Importantly, the particular 
work-related conditions, as well as the magnitude and length of sanctions, vary across countries, 
including the claimant groups to which they apply. In the UK, for example, conditions and sanctions 
now affect benefits designed to support unemployed individuals, lone parents, long-term sick and 
disabled people as well as people in low-paid employment (Dwyer and Wright, 2014). 
The shift towards work-related behavioural conditionality is an important constitutive element of a 
broader ‘activation turn’ (Bonoli, 2010: 435) in international social security and labour market policy. 
Distinctive from earlier forms of active labour market policies (ALMPs), initiatives since the 1990s 
have combined work incentivisation and job-search assistance through a variety of ‘punitive and 
enabling mechanisms’ (Raffass, 2017: 350). With regards work incentives, activation has involved the 
development of minimum wages and in-work benefits alongside cuts in the generosity of benefits 
and sanctions (Immervoll and Scarpetta, 2012). In terms of employment assistance, furthermore, 
activation differs according to ‘human capital development’ and ‘work first’ approaches (Lindsay et 
al., 2007). Human capital development emphasises investment in skills, education and training, 
whereas work first approaches focus on job search and more basic skills training in order to get 
unemployed individuals into work as quickly as possible. Prior to 2010, the UK’s work first approach 
to activation combined both disciplinary and assistive measures, in the form of sanctions and a 
variety of employment-related support initiatives (Lindsay, 2007). These supportive aspects were 
then diminished, however, as a result of the Coalition government’s (2010-15) subsequent ‘punitive 
turn’ (Fletcher and Wright, 2018: 324).  
A variety of demanding social security reforms were implemented by the Coalition government; this 
article focuses specifically on sanctions imposed on unemployed individuals claiming Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JSA), which saw two important developments. First, the frequency of sanctions was 
consistently high compared with previous rates observed since the introduction of JSA in 1996 (NAO, 
2016a). Between 2010 and 2015, nearly a quarter (24%) of JSA claimants received at least one 
sanction; monthly sanctions rates varied dramatically, more than doubling from approximately 3% in 
May 2010 to a peak of over 7% in October 2013, before gradually returning to their pre-Coalition 
level by late 2015. Second, the severity of sanctions was increased by the Welfare Reform Act 2012. 
Following its implementation in October 2012, the minimum sanction period increased from one to 
four weeks and the maximum from 26 to 156 weeks, depending on the type and number of 
sanctionable actions incurred (DWP, 2013). Such sanctions represent full benefit withdrawal for the 
period in question, from an already low benefit level. Sanctioned claimants can apply for hardship 
payments amounting to 60% of JSA or 80% for those deemed ‘vulnerable’, which begin in the third 
week after a sanction for the former group and immediately for the latter group. Before the October 
2012 changes, less than 10% of sanctions resulted in a hardship award, a figure that rose to over 
40% by the end of 2014 (Webster, 2015).  
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Sanctions policy generally, including these developments specifically, has generated significant 
debate regarding impacts on claimants, and it is to this literature that this article now turns.  
The impacts of benefit sanctions 
Work-related conditionality and benefit sanctions are explicitly intended to improve labour market 
outcomes for claimants, which has motivated an extensive literature on labour market effects 
(Griggs and Evans, 2010). Evidence from across different social security systems arguably provides 
some support to the claim that sanctions improve rates of employment re-entry in the short-term. In 
the longer-term, however, the same literature suggests that there are negative impacts on wages 
and job stability as well as no perceivable employment effect (Arni et al., 2013; van den Berg and 
Vikström, 2014; van den Berg et al., 2017; Taulbut et al., 2018). The most methodologically robust 
UK study is based on long-term unemployed Work Programme participants (NAO, 2016b). It finds 
that sanctions increase the likelihood of employment up to a year after being sanctioned, though the 
impact on earnings is negative. Indeed, sanctions are also found to increase exits from JSA without 
employment, a result that is supported by additional UK analysis conducted at the local authority-
level (Loopstra et al., 2015). Importantly, the results of the NAO (2016b) study differ by the claimant 
group in question; employment re-entry effects are in fact negative for those claiming Employment 
and Support Allowance (ESA) due to sickness or disability. 
In light of the mixed evidence on labour market impacts, a growing area of research identifies a 
wider range of possible, consistently negative, sanction-related impacts. The risk that sanctions will 
lead to financial hardship for claimants is confirmed by several policy reviews carried out by separate 
UK government departments (Vincent, 1998; Saunders et al., 2001; Peters and Joyce, 2006; Dorsett 
et al., 2011). In the largest of these studies, Peters and Joyce (2006) found that over two-thirds of 
sanctioned claimants experienced financial hardship, whilst many were forced to borrow money 
from friends and family in order to survive. These individuals had difficulty paying utility bills, rent 
and managing debt; many had already been struggling to get by financially on JSA, a situation that 
was aggravated by the imposition of a sanction. These findings are supported by the academic 
literature, where sanctions have been linked to rises in the number of people being fed by food 
banks in both qualitative and quantitative research (Lambie-Mumford, 2014; Loopstra et al., 2018). 
Sanctions have also been associated with negative impacts on third parties, including the friends, 
family and children of claimants (Watts et al., 2014).  
It is increasingly recognised, furthermore, that sanctions are likely to affect the mental health and 
wellbeing of claimants. Evidence with regards the impact of JSA sanctions specifically is, however, 
scarce. In particular, Stewart and Wright (2018) conduct longitudinal qualitative interviews with JSA 
claimants and find that sanctions are commonly associated with impacts such as stress, anxiety and 
depression, caused both by the fear of and actual imposition of benefit sanctions. Additional 
qualitative research identifies negative psychological impacts of sanctions on groups such as lone 
parents, disabled people and homeless people (Dwyer et al., 2018; Johnsen et al., 2018; Johnsen and 
Blenkinsopp, 2018). Quantitative research in this area has focused more broadly on the impact of 
work-related behavioural conditionality. A natural experiment study by Katikireddi and colleagues 
(2018), for example, finds that conditionality negatively impacts the mental health of lone parents in 
the UK, which is supported by evidence from the US (Davis, 2019). The research carried out here, in 
contrast, contributes to the emerging literature through consideration of the quantitative 
relationship between sanctions and mental health, focusing in particular on JSA sanctions and rates 
of antidepressant prescribing.  
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The determinants of antidepressant prescribing 
Antidepressant medication is prescribed to treat individuals suffering from anxiety and depression, 
and therefore represents a salient – albeit imperfect – means of investigating these particular 
aspects of mental health. Not all individuals suffering from anxiety and depression will be prescribed 
antidepressant medication, since there are differences in the likelihood of recognising and reporting 
mental health problems, as well as in GP prescribing behaviour and the exploration of alternative 
treatments (Hyde et al., 2005). A high correlation, nevertheless, exists between the two (Barr et al., 
2016). Existing quantitative research on the determinants of antidepressant prescribing in the UK 
considers the factors that explain variations in prescribing rates at the GP practice-level, and takes 
into account a combination of the characteristics of registered patients, the GP practice itself as well 
as area-level determinants. Spence and colleagues (2014), for example, find that antidepressant 
prescribing is higher in GP practices that have patients with higher proportions of older people, 
women and white people. Morrison and colleagues (2009), furthermore, find that greater 
proportions of GPs who are female, young or born in the UK are also associated with higher levels of 
antidepressant prescribing.  
The quantitative analysis in this study is carried out solely at the local authority-level, which – due to 
data availability – is a feature of the UK quantitative literature on the impacts of sanctions more 
generally. Area-level factors associated with higher antidepressant prescribing at the GP-level 
include higher levels of deprivation as well as greater levels of urbanisation (Morrison et al., 2009; 
Sreeharan et al., 2013). Additional area-level research emphasises the influence of economic factors, 
with higher levels of antidepressant prescribing being associated with higher unemployment rates 
and lower rates of economic output (Barr et al., 2016). The study by Barr and colleagues (2016) also 
highlights the role of the social security system more broadly, finding that rates of antidepressant 
prescribing are higher in local authorities with a greater cumulative proportion of Work Capability 
Assessments (WCAs) for claimants of the main out-of-work disability benefit. Sanctions represent an 
important additional determinant to the factors already discussed, not least as a result of the serious 
material implications that they hold; in terms of JSA withdrawal absent of a hardship payment, a 
four-week sanction amounts to the loss of over £230 for somebody aged 18-24 and over £290 for 
somebody aged 25 and over (NAO, 2016a).  
Ecological analyses are affected by well-known limitations, whereby correlations that hold at the 
area-level do not necessarily apply at the individual-level, and vice versa. Using aggregate-level data 
is nevertheless informative given current data constraints, as it permits investigation of the 
relationship between sanctions and antidepressants as indicated by variations in local authority-level 
rates through time. In addition, this level of analysis is able to capture potential mental health 
impacts of sanctions on claimants themselves as well as any possible third-party impacts on friends 
and family. As previously indicated, this article focuses on the period of Coalition government (2010-
15) which imposed a comparatively high number of benefit sanctions and increased their severity 
through the Welfare Reform Act 2012. These developments in sanctions policy inform the following 
research questions: 
1. Are benefit sanctions associated with higher rates of antidepressant prescribing at the local 
authority-level? 
2. Does the observed relationship strengthen following the implementation of the Welfare 
Reform Act 2012? 
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3. Data and Methods 
Analytic sample 
NHS Digital publishes monthly antidepressant prescribing data for all practices in England, beginning 
in June 2010; this study carries out a quarterly analysis and thus begins at the third quarter of 2010, 
coinciding with the early months of the Coalition government and the initial rise in rates of JSA 
sanctions. February 2015 marked the start of the national expansion of Universal Credit (UC), the 
new benefit that replaces six existing means-tested benefits, including JSA (DWP, 2015). The rollout 
of UC systematically altered the composition of the remaining JSA claimant group by initially only 
being open to younger unemployed individuals without dependents (DWP, 2014). Due to data 
availability, however, UC sanctions could not be included in the analysis; in order to minimise the 
influence of compositional change, therefore, data are included up to and including the fourth 
quarter of 2014, prior to the national rollout. In the remaining pre-2015 sample, 31 local authorities 
were affected by the Pathfinder phase of UC that began in April 2013, totalling 78 local authority 
quarters. These local authority quarters are removed in the analysis presented here, though the 
results remain substantively unchanged with or without their inclusion; this similarity is unsurprising 
given the small number of individuals claiming UC by December 2014 (DWP, 2018). There are 326 
local authority areas in England, though the City of London and the Isles of Scilly are excluded from 
the analysis due to their small population size.  
Antidepressant prescribing data 
Data on the number of antidepressant items prescribed by GP practices in England are accessed 
from NHS Digital (2018), measured using ‘Selective Serotonin Re-Uptake Inhibitors’ (SSRIs), the first-
line medication for treating anxiety and depression (NICE, 2015). SSRIs are the most appropriate 
indicator to capture impacts on anxiety and depression since the broader total antidepressant 
measure includes items prescribed to treat non-psychiatric health conditions such as chronic pain 
(Spence et al., 2014). Prescription items are single supplies of a medicine that generally refer to 
month-long prescriptions, though the length of prescription items will vary depending on the length 
of treatment or quantity of medicine prescribed (HSCIC, 2015). Quarterly rates of SSRI prescribing 
per 100,000 population are constructed for each local authority by aggregating monthly GP practice-
level data and using mid-year population estimates that were updated in 2018 and available through 
Nomis (ONS, 2018). A key limitation is that the prescribing data do not contain any patient-related 
information, meaning that it is not possible to construct prescribing rates per working age 
population, which is the group who are at risk of sanctioning if claiming JSA. Consequently, all 
variables included in the analysis are expressed as quarterly rates per 100,000 total population. This 
is unlikely to unduly influence the results obtained, however, which control for age and estimate the 
effect of sanctions by exploiting variations in local authority-level rates through time.  
Sanctioning data and additional explanatory variables 
Data on the number of JSA sanctions are accessed from Stat-Xplore (DWP, 2018). This database is 
limited in that it records only the latest decision for each sanction case, meaning that it is not 
possible to calculate the total number of sanctions imposed in any one quarter. Sanctions that have 
gone through the review, reconsideration or appeal process, for example, will be recorded at a later 
point in time from the original sanctioning decision, even though claimants will have had their 
benefits stopped throughout. Consistent with other studies in the literature, the analysis here uses 
original adverse sanctions as its main sanctions variable (Loopstra et al., 2018; Taulbut et al., 2018). 
This measure benefits from its specificity to the quarter in question, though it underestimates the 
true sanctions figure as it does not include sanctions that are challenged, reaching up to a fifth of 
sanctions during the period of analysis (Kennedy and Keen, 2016). One additional limitation is that it 
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is not possible to include ESA sanctions at the local authority-level. Similar to JSA sanctions, ESA 
sanctions saw a rise and fall in the frequency of their application around October 2013, whilst their 
severity increased from December 2012 (Webster, 2016). These variations, nevertheless, were 
smaller than those for JSA sanctions and occurred from a lower base-level. Indeed, Figure A1 in the 
online appendix contrasts the JSA and ESA sanctions rates throughout the period using original 
adverse sanctions in England; the contrasting trends suggests that the omission of ESA sanctions 
does not represent a serious source of omitted variable bias on the results of the analysis.  
Additional explanatory variables are included in the analysis, informed by the previous discussion on 
the determinants of antidepressant prescribing and sourced from Nomis, Stat-Xplore and additional 
UK government departments (see online appendix Table A1). These include data on the monthly 
number of JSA claimants, averaged over the quarter to provide an estimate of the quarterly claimant 
count, as well as GVA per head – a local authority-level equivalent of GDP – to capture the influence 
of economic trends. Unemployment measured according to the ILO definition is also investigated, as 
well as economic inactivity, using Annual Population Survey (APS) data for 12-month periods 
beginning every quarter. In addition to GVA per head, a residence-based measure of local authority-
level income – GDHI per head – is investigated, which did not alter the substantive results presented 
here. Demographic characteristics such as annual proportions of separate age groups, gender and 
ethnicity are included, as well as quarterly rates of WCAs, the Index of Multiple Deprivation and 
rural-urban classification. Finally, quarterly rates of antibiotic prescribing are included as a proxy for 
the propensity of GPs to prescribe in general, reflective of discretionary prescribing behaviour 
(Spence et al., 2014). 
Statistical analysis 
To investigate the relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing, the analysis estimates fixed 
effects models with a basic form described in Equation 1: 
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
In Equation 1, i denotes the local authority and t denotes the quarter. SSRI is the SSRI prescribing 
rate per 100,000 population, Sanctions is the JSA sanctions rate per 100,000 population and X 
represents a vector of additional control variables. μ denotes local authority fixed effects, λ denotes 
time fixed effects and ε represents the error term. The inclusion of local authority fixed effects 
controls for time-invariant unobserved differences between areas, meaning that the analysis 
estimates the average association between sanctions and antidepressants within local authorities. 
The inclusion of time fixed effects controls for the influence of factors that are constant across local 
authorities but that vary over time, without the need to impose a functional form on the relationship 
between SSRI prescribing and time. All estimated models use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, which 
are robust to heteroscedasticity, correlation through time within local authorities and general forms 
of cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2007). 
As part of the initial regression modelling process, additional time-variant control variables were first 
included (see online appendix Table A2, Model A1). As a sensitivity check, this model was repeated 
with the inclusion of separate time trends by quintile of deprivation and rural-urban classification, 
which allows the trend in antidepressants to vary by level of baseline deprivation and rurality (Model 
A2). The coefficients for these interactions estimate how the effect of deprivation and rurality 
change over the period, with their main baseline effects absorbed into the local authority fixed 
effects as in Equation 1 (Allison, 2009). Given the significance of these interactions and the increase 
in within-R2, this model was ultimately favoured and its results will be discussed in full in the next 
section. Diagnostic tests for this model are detailed in the online appendix. As a final check, the 
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analysis was repeated through estimation of a random effects model, which adjusts for time-
invariant factors by making the relatively stricter assumption that any omitted variables are 
uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables (Model A3). A Hausman test of this assumption 
indicates that a random effects framework should not be favoured here (p < 0.001).  
The next stage of the analysis considers the second research question outlined above, and 
investigates the impact of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. To capture the effect of this reform, which 
increased the average length of sanctions, Equation 2 modifies the initial fixed effects analysis 
through inclusion of an interaction term with Sanctions and Reform:  
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
Reform is a dummy variable that marks the quarters before and after the implementation of the 
harsher sanctions regime brought about by the Welfare Reform Act 2012; it is coded 1 for quarters 
Q4 2012 onwards and 0 before that date.  
4. Results 
Full time period 
Results for the full time period indicate that sanction rates are positively associated with rates of 
antidepressant prescribing. The correlation between original adverse sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
is displayed in Figure 1, which indicates that in local authority quarters where the rate of sanctioning 
is higher, so too are rates of SSRI prescribing (r = 0.146; p < 0.001). There were an average of 12,946 
SSRI items and 223 sanctions per 100,000 population per quarter in local authorities (see online 
appendix Table A1); Blackpool stands out in particular with an average of 24,567 SSRI items and 520 
sanctions. Beatty and Fothergill (2013) estimate that Blackpool, including a number of other seaside 
areas (Torbay, Hastings, Great Yarmouth and Thanet) were particularly badly hit in financial terms by 
welfare reform under the Coalition government. This is due to the high proportions of working-age 
adults claiming out-of-work benefits in these areas, attracted by the availability of cheap private 
rental sector accommodation. As a sensitivity test, these local authorities were removed from the 
sample in order to mitigate any potential undue influence; the substantive results remain 
unchanged, however, and so the results discussed here pertain to the full sample.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Estimates from the fixed effects analysis are displayed in Table 1. Importantly, the results in Model 1 
indicate that sanctions are associated with increases in antidepressant prescribing rates; for every 10 
additional sanctions applied per 100,000 population, the rate of SSRI prescribing is 3.71 items higher 
per 100,000 population (p < 0.001). The additional control variables included in Model 1 generally 
conform to the expected relationship as discussed in Section 2; a negative association exists with 
regards GVA , whilst a positive association exists between SSRI prescribing and rates of economic 
inactivity, females and WCAs at the local authority-level, though the latter result is non-significant. A 
zero coefficient is estimated for rates of white UK born at the local authority-level; comparison with 
the estimated random effects coefficient in Model A3 (online appendix Table A2) indicates that this 
result is explained by the well-known difficulties in estimating slowly changing variables using fixed 
effects (Plümper and Troeger, 2007). The estimation of the separate age group coefficients was 
affected by high multicollinearity, furthermore, though their inclusion did not affect the main 
substantive results and so are included in Model 1 in any case.  
[Table 1 about here] 
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A key counterintuitive result in Model 1 is the estimated negative coefficient for the rate of 
unemployment, given the well-established link between unemployment and poor mental health, as 
well as the observed association with antidepressant prescribing at the individual-level (von Soest et 
al., 2012). The ILO measure of unemployment was favoured over the claimant count measure in the 
analysis for two key reasons; the claimant count captures a narrower set of unemployed individuals 
and had a high degree of collinearity with sanctions (r = 0.793), which was potentially driving an 
unexpected negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient. When the ILO measure of 
unemployment is used in Model 1, however, the coefficient remains negative but is non-significant. 
The correlation between unemployment and sanctions is lower (r = 0.586), suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not influencing the counterintuitive estimate. A plausible explanation of this 
result relates to the previously identified risk of ecological bias, whereby correlations that hold at 
the area-level do not necessarily apply at the individual-level. Indeed, this issue is present in existing 
area-level research into the relationship between unemployment and antidepressant prescribing, 
which finds contradictory results (Lundin and Hansson, 2014; Spence et al., 2014). This highlights an 
important limitation to the current study as well as emphasises the need for additional individual-
level analysis to better understand the relationships that are investigated here.  
Influence of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 
Next, the analysis examines whether the observed associations between sanctions and SSRI 
prescribing are stronger in the period following the implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. 
The full Model 2 results are displayed in Table 1, which indicate that before the implementation of 
the Act, for every 10 additional sanctions applied per 100,000 population the rate of SSRI prescribing 
is 1.74 items per 100,000 population higher, though this result is not significant at the 5% level. 
Consistent with the implementation of the harsher sanctions regime, however, following the reform 
the association increases by 2.82 prescribing items, so that every 10 additional sanctions applied per 
100,000 population are associated with 4.57 additional SSRI prescribing items (p < 0.001). These 
results are summarised in Figure 2, which displays the estimated sanctions coefficient for the full 
period, as well as the pre- and post-Act periods.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Robustness tests 
In addition to the sensitivity checks already discussed, two further tests are conducted to investigate 
the robustness of the results obtained. First, a falsification test is carried out using the non-
equivalent dependent variable approach (Shadish et al., 2002). This tests for omitted variables bias 
by identifying an additional dependent variable that should not be affected by sanctions but that 
could be influenced by the same potential unobserved confounding factors as for SSRI prescribing 
rates. Following Barr and colleagues (2016), the rate of cardiovascular drug prescribing is used, on 
the basis that it is unlikely that the health conditions treated by such items will be affected by 
sanctions, especially in the short term. Cardiovascular prescribing is not an arbitrary choice, 
however, as it will arguably be affected by potential unobserved confounders to SSRI prescribing, 
such as changes in access to primary healthcare across the study period, or changes in the 
propensity of individuals to report health problems to their GP. The results of the main analysis are 
supported by the fact that no statistically significant relationship is found between sanctions and 
cardiovascular prescribing, either across the time period or in the pre- and post-Welfare Reform Act 
periods (see online appendix Table A4).  
Second, a Granger-test for reverse causality is carried out, to consider whether the main analysis 
specified the correct direction of causal inference (Dumitrescu and Hurlin, 2012). The focus of this 
article has been on the impacts of benefit sanctions at the local authority-level, though a conceivable 
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alternate explanation is that the direction of causality runs in the opposite direction: that there is an 
increased risk of sanctions in areas with higher levels of individuals already suffering from poor 
mental health and being prescribed antidepressants. The Granger-test is carried out in two steps. 
First, it tests whether lagged values of sanctions are jointly associated with SSRI prescribing, as is 
implied by the notion that cause precedes effect. It then tests whether lagged values of SSRI 
prescribing are jointly associated with sanctions, to provide an assessment of whether the model is 
affected by reverse causation. Here, sanctions are found to Granger-cause SSRI prescribing (p < 0.01) 
whilst SSRI prescribing is not found to Granger-cause sanctions (p = 0.860). This test is premised on a 
specific notion of causality based on the predictive content of variables, and therefore cannot be 
used to rule out the issue of reverse causation, though these results nonetheless support the local 
authority-level inferences made in the main analysis.  
5. Discussion 
The results of this study suggest that higher sanction rates are associated with increases in SSRI 
prescribing within local authorities, which is indicative of adverse mental health impacts relating to 
anxiety and depression. Following the implementation of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the 
introduction of a much harsher sanctions regime, the results indicate that every 10 additional 
sanctions applied per 100,000 population are associated with approximately 4.57 additional SSRI 
prescribing items, a result that is significant at the 1% level (p < 0.001). Given that the average length 
of a prescribing item is one month, meaning that one person might receive three prescribing items 
per quarter, this estimated quarterly relationship with SSRI prescribing items arguably translates to 
between one and two additional people receiving treatment. Since the analysis makes use of a 
sanctions indicator that underestimates the true quarterly rate, a best guess estimate would imply 
that every 10 additional sanctions applied per 100,000 population are associated with approximately 
one additional person receiving treatment.  
As previously emphasised, this study is carried out at the local authority-level and the results 
obtained are subject to important limitations in this regard. Using such aggregate-level data, for 
example, it is not possible to ascertain whether the people being sanctioned are the same as those 
who are ultimately prescribed antidepressants. Indeed, the findings themselves pertain to SSRI 
prescribing items and not individuals, meaning that the estimated impact in terms of people 
outlined above should be treated as purely indicative. The risk of mistakenly applying area-level 
associations to individual-level relationships was made clear in the results section, furthermore, 
whilst it has been recognised that this level of analysis will also capture potential third-party mental 
health impacts on the friends and family of those being sanctioned. It is an important finding, 
nevertheless, that the scale and severity of sanctions following the implementation of the Welfare 
Reform Act 2012 were sufficient to have observable impacts even at the local authority-level.  
The Welfare Reform Act 2012 was not limited to the JSA sanctions changes that have been the focus 
of this article, and the analysis is not able to control for all aspects of welfare reform that occurred 
throughout the period of Coalition government. In addition to providing for the introduction of 
Universal Credit, for example, the Act announced a benefit cap, changes to Housing Benefit (the 
‘bedroom tax’), the replacement of Disability Living Allowance with Personal Independence 
Payments and changes to eligibility for contributory ESA. The role of omitted variable bias is of 
concern in all quantitative analyses, and the same is true here, though it is important to emphasise 
that the findings are robust to a variety of different model specifications in fixed effects regressions 
that control for differences between local authorities. Indeed, for omitted variable bias to affect the 
key finding relating to the relationship between sanctions and antidepressant prescribing in the 
post-reform period, any omitted variable would have to be systematically correlated with sanction 
11 
 
rates from October 2012 onwards; it is not clear why that would pertain in the current context. 
These results therefore provide a valuable estimate that motivates further investigation of this issue 
using individual-level data, which would be better placed to identify causal impacts.  
Despite the limitations outlined, the findings support existing empirical research regarding the 
negative mental health impacts of benefit sanctions. Indeed, there are good theoretical 
considerations that link sanctions to adverse mental health impacts, irrespective of a claimant’s prior 
health status. Unemployment is itself associated with poor mental health, which has been explained 
through a combination of both material and psychosocial pathways (Sage, 2018); material factors 
are concerned with financial impacts, whilst psychosocial considerations attend to the experience of 
unemployment and how it is shaped by social structures. Material factors can be understood as 
central determinants with psychosocial factors providing an explanatory pathway that connects 
material circumstances to health outcomes (Smith and Anderson, 2018). Indeed, a growing body of 
research investigates how financial stress gets ‘under the skin’ (Sturgeon et al., 2016: 134) of 
individuals to impact their mental health, which is considered a psychosocial explanation despite its 
direct relationship to material concerns. In addition, psychosocial factors have been articulated to 
identify qualitatively specific aspects of the experience of unemployment that might explain impacts 
on health; Sage (2018), for example, categorises these in terms of loss of agency and loss of social 
status, the latter of which includes stigma.  
Benefit sanctions – and the work-related behavioural conditions that they enforce – are a key means 
through which the state shapes claimants’ experience of unemployment, and the mental health 
impacts can therefore be expected to operate along the material and psychosocial dimensions 
outlined above. As has been previously highlighted, the imposition of a benefit sanction holds 
serious material implications for individuals both in terms of JSA withdrawal as well as additional 
knock-on effects on managing debt. The psychosocial route, in contrast, will operate in response to 
both the threat and imposition of benefit sanctions, through financial stress as well as through 
impacts on claimants’ perceived agency and social status. Indeed, empirical research suggests that 
many sanctioned JSA claimants disagreed with the reasons behind their sanction, viewing the 
circumstances as unfair and reporting feelings of powerlessness and stigmatisation (Stewart and 
Wright, 2018). Whilst the financial impact of a sanction can be partially moderated through receipt 
of a hardship payment, fewer than half of claimants receive these. Since 2017, JSA claimants already 
suffering from mental health problems have been deemed to represent a ‘vulnerable’ group, and are 
therefore eligible for an immediate hardship payment (HM Government, 2017). Whilst this change is 
welcome, the findings presented here suggest that much greater consideration needs to be given to 
the mental health of all claimants subjected to sanctions.  
In policy terms, the results of this study highlight an important dimension that needs to be 
considered when assessing sanctions policy. In its review of the benefit sanctions regime, the 
National Audit Office (NAO, 2016a: 10) argues that the DWP provided ‘little evidence for its design 
choices’ when implementing the changes specified in the Welfare Reform Act 2012; the findings 
presented here suggest that the reforms had serious implications for the mental health of claimants 
and those around them, leading to additional use of antidepressant medication. The evidence 
therefore motivates the need to reconsider the frequency and severity with which sanctions are 
imposed on unemployed claimants, a conclusion that arguably extends to other out-of-work 
claimant groups. The results also highlight that sanctions are likely to require additional public 
spending to support those affected by them, which needs to be taken into account when assessing 
the net cost of their application. These issues are of increasing relevance in the post-Coalition 
period, in which the Conservative government (2015-) continues the rollout of Universal Credit (UC). 
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The sanctions regime introduced by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 forms the basis of enforcement 
within UC, which – in addition to the introduction of repayable hardship payments – has operated 
with a higher rate of sanctions since its inception compared with JSA (NAO, 2016a).  
More widely, this article informs ongoing debates regarding the ethical justification of conditionality 
within the contemporary social security system. The growth in work-related behavioural conditions 
for a variety of out-of-work benefits is subject to contestation by a range of normative perspectives, 
including – though not limited to – rights-based, social justice, contractualist and paternalist 
frameworks (Watts and Fitzpatrick, 2018). Whilst the differences between these perspectives are 
not resolvable through empirical investigation alone, an overall assessment of work-related 
behavioural conditionality must nevertheless take into account evidence on the impacts of 
conditional approaches. The findings presented here indicate that JSA sanctions are associated with 
adverse mental health impacts, which, whilst requiring further investigation, support the results 
from the literature on sanctions, conditionality and mental health for various claimant groups (Davis, 
2019; Katikireddi et al., 2018; Stewart and Wright, 2018). As previously highlighted, the evidence in 
terms of labour market outcomes does not provide clear support for the use of sanctions, whilst the 
wider literature finds consistently negative impacts in terms of outcomes such as financial hardship 
and increased food bank usage. When such research is considered collectively, therefore, it would 
appear difficult for any normative viewpoint to support sanctions policy in its current form.   
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Appendix 
Comparison of JSA and ESA sanction rates 
Figure A1 compares the JSA and ESA sanctions rate during the period of analysis. Due to recent 
changes in how the DWP publish claimant statistics, the rates themselves are only presented for four 
particular months during each year (February, May, August and November). JSA and ESA sanction 
rates are calculated using original adverse sanctions relating to claimants in England only, and measure 
sanctions as a proportion of JSA claimants and ESA WRAG claimants respectively. The different 
variations in rates of JSA and ESA sanctions implies that the analysis is not seriously affected by its 
omission of ESA sanctions at the local authority-level in the fixed effects regression models.  
Figure A1: JSA and ESA sanctions rate (per cent of claimants), 2010-2014 
 
Source: author’s calculations using Stat-Xplore data 
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Summary statistics 
Table A1: descriptive statistics for 324 local authorities, across 18 quarters (Q3 2010 – Q4 2014) 
 N Mean St.d Dev. Min. Max. Source 
Dependent variable:       
SSRI prescribing 5,754 12,946 3,411 5,114 28,830 NHS Digital 
Sanctions variable:       
Original adverse 5,754 223 139 9 969 Stat-Xplore 
Control variables:       
Claimants 5,754 1,851 964 287 6,033 Nomis 
Unemployment 5,459 3,514 1,393 603 10,044 Nomis 
Economic Inactivity 5,754 13,809 3,133 5,618 25,575 Nomis 
Employment 5,754 45,363 3,587 28,553 59,802 Nomis 
Work Capability Assessments 5,754 248 129 26 1,173 Stat-Xplore 
GVA 5,754 22,886 14,435 11,876 235,244 Nomis 
GDHI 5,754 18,105 4,374 10,728 59,879 Nomis 
Age      Nomis 
0-15 year olds 5,754 18,586 1,837 13,712 26,967  
16-29 year olds 5,754 17,358 3,846 11,644 32,959  
30-49 year olds 5,754 27,132 2,817 18,670 37,897  
50-64 year olds 5,754 18,741 2,433 9,145 24,038  
65 and above 5,754 18,182 4,385 6,018 31,854  
Female 5,754 50,829 697 45,813 52,562 Nomis 
White UK born 5,754 82,636 15,482 13,921 99,042 Nomis 
Antibiotics prescribing 5,754 17,347 3,117 8,788 38,915 NHS Digital 
Index of Multiple Deprivation      DCLG 
Quintile 1 1,166      
Quintile 2 1,157      
Quintile 3 1,140      
Quintile 4 1,165      
Quintile 5 1,126      
Urban-Rural Classification      Defra 
Predominantly rural 1,620      
Urban with significant 
rural 
959      
Predominantly urban 3,175      
Falsification variable:       
Cardiovascular Prescribing 5,754 144,487 36,595 58,061 288,986 NHS Digital 
Note: suppression of values for the APS unemployment estimates leads to the fall in the sample 
size. 
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Initial modelling process 
Table A2: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 
Model A1: 
Fixed effects 
Model A2: 
Fixed effects 
Model A3: 
Random effects 
Sanctions 
0.465* 
(0.206) 
0.371*** 
(0.079) 
0.478** 
(0.180) 
Unemployment 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
Economic Inactivity 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
WCAs 
0.440 
(0.595) 
0.199 
(0.412) 
0.528*** 
(0.162) 
GVA 
-0.054*** 
(0.013) 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
-0.038** 
(0.013) 
Age    
16–29 
-0.001 
(0.067) 
-0.168*** 
(0.035) 
0.104 
(0.100) 
30–49 
-0.261* 
(0.090) 
-0.589*** 
(0.075) 
-0.147 
(0.137) 
50–64 
-0.208** 
(0.071) 
-0.519*** 
(0.072) 
-0.020 
(0.142) 
65 and over 
0.144** 
(0.047) 
0.011 
(0.034) 
0.229* 
(0.095) 
Female 
0.145 
(0.108) 
0.558*** 
(0.069) 
0.083 
(0.161) 
White UK born 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
0.015* 
(0.006) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.111*** 
(0.019) 
0.086*** 
(0.015) 
0.133*** 
(0.021) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation    
Quintile 2  
 370.56 
(368.396) 
Quintile 3  
 1,268.77*** 
(371.098) 
Quintile 4  
 2,215.73*** 
(398.461) 
Quintile 5  
 3,052.26*** 
(469.230) 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with significant 
rural 
 
 -419.259 
(405.112) 
Predominantly urban  
 -1224.087*** 
(362.712) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation    
Quintile 2 × Quarter  
37.508*** 
(2.112) 
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Quintile 3 × Quarter  
60.046*** 
(3.042) 
 
Quintile 4 × Quarter  
75.667*** 
(4.671) 
 
Quintile 5 × Quarter  
114.015*** 
(7.715) 
 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with significant 
rural × Quarter 
 
-22.709*** 
(2.189) 
 
Predominantly urban × 
Quarter 
 
-30.276*** 
(3.388) 
 
R2 (within) 0.866 0.889 0.865 
LA Quarters 5,459 5,459 5,459 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Model A1 and A2 include local authority and time fixed 
effects; Model A3 includes time fixed effects. Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001 
 
  
21 
 
Diagnostic tests 
Various diagnostic checks are carried out to test that the fixed effects model assumptions are 
satisfied (Greene, 2008). The diagnostic checks presented here are for regression Model 1 in Table 1.  
Normality of the residuals 
Figure A2 depicts a histogram of the regression residuals to check for serious deviations from the 
assumption of normality. Clearly, the residuals do not deviate sufficiently from the ideal of normality 
to be of concern to the results of the analysis. Three formal tests of normality, a Skewness/Kurtosis 
test (p < 0.001), a Shapiro-Wilk test (p < 0.001) and a Shapiro-Francia test (p < 0.001) reject the null 
of normality. However, as Ghasemi and Zahedias (2012) outline, such tests are sensitive to even very 
small deviations from normality at large sample sizes. The rejection of normality by such tests is 
therefore not of concern to the analysis, given the distribution that is actually observed.  
Figure A2: distribution of regression residuals compared against normal distribution curve 
 
Cross-sectional independence, homoscedasticity, no serial correlation and stationarity 
The tests carried out in this sub-section indicate that the fixed effects models suffer from cross-
sectional dependence, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, though there are important caveats 
on the tests themselves that will be explained in more detail in the following discussion. 
Consequently, the fixed effects regression models estimated throughout the analysis use Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998), which are robust to cross-sectional dependence, 
heteroscedasticity and correlation through time within local authorities. These are implemented 
using the Stata command ‘xtscc’, developed by Hoechle (2007).  
First, a check for cross-sectional dependence is carried out. The standard test of this issue is the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, as developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980). This test 
isn’t valid in panels with a large number of observations (N) but a small number of observations per 
cross-sectional unit (T), which is the case here (N = 324, T = 18). Instead, Pesaran’s (2004) cross-
sectional dependence (CD) test is carried out, using the ‘xtcsd’ Stata command developed by De 
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
8
0
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
-2,000 -1,000 0 1,000 2,000
Residuals
22 
 
Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006), which is compatible with unbalanced datasets. The Pesaran (2004) CD 
test rejects the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence (p < 0.05).  
Next, in order to check for heteroscedasticity, a modified Wald test (Greene, 2008) is carried out 
that tests for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals of fixed effect regression models, using 
the Stata command ‘xttest3’ developed by Baum (2001). The modified Wald test rejects the null of 
homoscedasticity (p < 0.001), which indicates that the residuals display heteroscedasticity. This test, 
however, has a very low power in the context of fixed effects with ‘large N, small T’ (Baum, 2001: 
102) panels, as is the case here. The result of the modified Wald test should, therefore, be treated 
with caution. Indeed, a scatter plot of the regression residuals against predicted values, furthermore, 
suggests that the error term has an approximately constant variance, since there is no sign of a 
fanning out effect over different predicted values. This is depicted in Figure A3.  
Figure A3: scatter plot of the regression residuals against predicted values 
 
Next, in order to check for serial correlation, a Wooldridge (2002) test is carried out using the Stata 
command ‘xtserial’ developed by Drukker (2003). The Wooldridge (2002) test rejects the null of no 
autocorrelation (p < 0.001), though – like the modified Wald test – is very sensitive in the context of 
fixed effects with a large N and small T panel (Drukker, 2003).  
Finally, in order to test for non-stationarity, Pesaran’s (2007) panel unit root test is carried out which 
– unlike many unit root tests – does not require the assumption of cross-sectional independence to 
be met. This is carried out using the Stata command ‘pescadf’ developed by Lewandowski (2007), 
which rejects the null of non-stationarity with or without a time trend included (p < 0.001).  
Unusual and Influential Data 
Next, checks for the influence of outliers and extreme observations are carried out. Firstly, 
observations with residuals that are two standard deviations from the mean in Model 1 are removed 
and the regression models re-estimated (Cousineau and Chartier, 2010). The results are shown in 
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Model 1 were re-run with the top and bottom one percentiles removed for sanctions (Model A5). 
Finally, the results were re-run with the seaside areas discussed in the results section removed 
(Model A6). The results across the separate models in Table A3 remain similar to the estimated 
sanctions coefficient in Model 1.  
Table A3: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 Model A4 Model A5 Model A6 
Sanctions 
0.344 *** 
(0.086) 
0.327** 
(0.109) 
0.409*** 
(0.083) 
R2 (within) 0.889 0.889 0.889 
LA Quarters 5,265 5,362 5,369 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant and additional control variables not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Falsification test 
 
  
Table A4: relationship between sanctions and cardiovascular prescribing 
 Model A7 Model A8 
Sanctions 
1.503 
(1.288) 
1.478 
(1.685) 
Sanctions x Reform  
0.035 
(1.575) 
Unemployment 
-0.037 
(0.086) 
-0.037 
(0.086) 
Economic Inactivity 
-0.054 
(0.057) 
-0.054 
(0.057) 
WCAs 
-2.463** 
(0.939) 
-2.465** 
(0.937) 
GVA 
0.099 
(0.083) 
0.099 
(0.082) 
Age   
16–29 
0.282 
(1.154) 
0.282 
(1.152) 
30–49 
0.843 
(1.710) 
0.842 
(1.708) 
50–64 
1.639 
(1.587) 
1.639 
(1.581) 
65 and over 
2.555* 
(1.039) 
2.555* 
(1.041) 
Female 
2.811* 
(1.134) 
2.810* 
(1.130) 
White UK born 
-0.008 
(0.041) 
-0.008 
(0.041) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.677*** 
(0.163) 
0.676*** 
(0.164) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
206.595* 
(84.586) 
206.465* 
(84.596) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
100.641 
(68.404) 
100.372 
(70.299) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
263.887*** 
(73.243) 
263.433*** 
(75.009) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
283.358** 
(93.980) 
282.593** 
(105.256) 
Urban-Rural Classification   
Urban with significant rural × 
Quarter 
-175.721* 
(77.698) 
175.766* 
(77.863) 
Predominantly urban × Quarter 
-192.588* 
(77.830) 
192.665* 
(78.036) 
R2 (within) 0.631 0.631 
LA Quarters 5,459 5,459 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Tables 
Table 1: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Sanctions 
0.371*** 
(0.079) 
0.174 
(0.179) 
Sanctions x Reform  
0.282 
(0.252) 
Unemployment 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
Economic Inactivity 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
WCAs 
0.199 
(0.412) 
0.186 
(0.413) 
GVA 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
-0.021* 
(0.008) 
Age    
16–29 
-0.168*** 
(0.035) 
-0.170*** 
(0.035) 
30–49 
-0.589*** 
(0.075) 
-0.590*** 
(0.076) 
50–64 
-0.519*** 
(0.072) 
-0.525*** 
(0.073) 
65 and over 
0.011 
(0.034) 
0.014 
(0.035) 
Female 
0.558*** 
(0.069) 
0.548*** 
(0.063) 
White UK born 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.002) 
Antibiotic Prescribing 
0.086*** 
(0.015) 
0.084*** 
(0.014) 
Index of Multiple Deprivation   
Quintile 2 × Quarter 
37.508*** 
(2.112) 
36.465*** 
(2.271) 
Quintile 3 × Quarter 
60.046*** 
(3.042) 
57.878*** 
(3.400) 
Quintile 4 × Quarter 
75.669*** 
(4.671) 
72.009*** 
(5.015) 
Quintile 5 × Quarter 
114.015*** 
(7.715) 
107.853*** 
(8.275) 
Urban-Rural Classification    
Urban with significant rural × Quarter 
-22.709*** 
(2.189) 
-23.077*** 
(2.128) 
Predominantly urban × Quarter 
-30.276*** 
(3.388) 
-30.891*** 
(3.212) 
R2 (within) 0.889 0.889 
LA Quarters 5,459 5,459 
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Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include local authority and time fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figures 
Figure 1: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 
Note: quarterly rates for 324 local authority districts, Q3 2010 – Q4 2014 
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Figure 2: relationship between sanctions and SSRI prescribing 
 
Note: Point estimates for sanctions are derived from Table 1. 
Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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